In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticised by Michael Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau's and Stegenga's criticisms.
Introduction
In my article 'Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn versus Arrow', I explored an analogy between the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories or hypotheses, and the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives or 'ways society might be' (Okasha 2011) . Theory choice presents a problem because there are multiple desiderata that we would like a theory to satisfy, e.g. fit-with-the-data and simplicity, which may pull in different directions, as Kuhn (1969 Kuhn ( , 1977a famously argued. Social choice presents a problem because there are multiple individuals in society, whose preferences over the alternatives may not coincide.
By identifying social alternatives with competing theories, and individuals with desiderata (or 'criteria of theory choice'), I showed that the theory choice problem and the social choice problem have essentially the same structure. In each case the problem is one of aggregating individual rankings into an overall ranking.
This aggregation problem has been extensively studied in social choice theory, which suggests using formal results from that field, such as Arrow's impossibility theorem, to study the problem of theory choice in science.
As is well-known, Kenneth Arrow (1951) argued that any reasonable aggregation procedure, or 'social choice rule' as I called it, should satisfy four conditions (Universal Domain, Non-dictatorship, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Weak Pareto); he then proved that these conditions cannot in fact be jointly satisfied, so long as the set of social alternatives contains at least three members. In Okasha 2011, I argued that the analogues of Arrow's four conditions are reasonable requirements to impose on a theory choice rule, and thus that, prima facie, an impossibility theorem should hold for theory choice. This conclusion is puzzling, given that scientists do (apparently) manage to make all-thingsconsidered judgments about which of a set of competing theories is the best; and such judgments often appear perfectly rational.
To resolve the puzzle, I considered a number of possible 'escape routes' from Arrow's impossibility result. I argued that one particular escape route, pioneered originally by Sen (1970 Sen ( , 1977 in relation to social choice, is applicable to at least some cases of theory choice in science. Sen's idea was to 'enrich the informational basis', by allowing as input into the social choice rule more than the merely ordinal rankings of alternatives, which permit no interpersonal comparisons, that Arrow employed. I showed how this escape route is implicit in two well-known approaches to theory choice in the philosophy of science (statistical model selection and Bayesianism), thus explaining how they avoid the threat of impossibility. Stegenga (2014) and Morreau (2014) both offer critical assessments of my arguments for which I am grateful. They arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions. Stegenga agrees with me that Arrow's impossibility result does potentially apply to theory choice, but disagrees with my suggestion that 'enriching the informational basis' offers a potential way out. Thus he thinks that it 'remains puzzling' how rational theory choice is possible (p.??). Morreau argues, by contrast, that there is no threat of impossibility in the first place, since the analogue of Arrow's condition U (unrestricted domain) does not apply to theory choice. (He argues similarly in Morreau 2013) . I reply to their arguments in turn.
Stegenga
Before turning to Stegenga's main criticisms of my paper, it is worth clearing up a number of technical errors that he has introduced into the discussion. In Part 3 of 3 his paper, Stegenga describes in his own words Sen's 'informational enrichment' strategy for avoiding Arrovian impossibility. Sen's key move was to use profiles of utility functions of the form <u 1, ...,u n > , rather than profiles of preference orderings of the form <R 1, ...,R n >, as input into the aggregation rule, where u i denotes individual i's utility function over the set of social alternatives in question; the aggregation rule is then known as 'a social welfare functional'. Stegenga unhelpfully describes a utility function as an assignment of real numbers to 'choices', rather than to alternatives, but this is a minor matter.
Less minor is Stegenga's discussion of how, in Sen's framework, Arrow's original condition I can be decomposed into sub-components, namely independence of irrelevant utilities (IIU) and ordinal non-comparability of utility (ONC), whose conjunction is logically equivalent to Arrow's condition I, as I In his discussion of the non-comparability of the different theoretical virtues, Stegenga conflates two issues. In Okasha 2011, I observed that in statistical inference, a common measure of how well a theory fits the data is the 'sum of squares' (SOS) score, in which case the criterion 'fit-with-the-data' becomes measurable on the same scale-type as the dependent variable on the regression plot. Stegenga says that the SOS measure is 'entirely conventional' (ibid. p.??). This is something of an exaggeration (the SOS measure has many desirable properties), but it is true that other measures of fit exist, which need not be ordinally equivalent to the SOS score. However this point-that 'fit-with-thedata' may be measured in different ways-has nothing to do with the main point in Stegenga's paragraph, which is that, however it is measured, the permissible transformations of the fit-with-the-data scale are independent of the permissible transformations of the scales on which the other theoretical virtues are measured.
This last point is correct, and is something I myself stressed; but it does not necessarily block the Sen-style escape route, for reasons given in my original paper and partly recapitulated three paragraphs back.
In Okasha 2011, I showed how the orthodox Bayesian approach to theory choice may be subsumed within a social choice-theoretic framework. There are two criteria of theory choice (or 'theoretical virtues'), prior probability P(T i ) and likelihood P(E/T i ), both of which are represented by real-valued functions on the theories {T 1 ,...,T n } that we wish to choose between, for a given body of evidence E. The Bayesian theory choice functional (the 'BCF' of my 2011 paper) then
generates an overall ranking of the theories according to the value of the product idiosyncratic, but rather in the more general idea that theory choice in science is based on multiple criteria that may pull in different directions. As I observed, this latter idea is common to diverse philosophical approaches to scientific inference, including Bayesianism, inference to the best explanation, and statistical model selection, so is not specific to Kuhn. My point in discussing the Bayesian approach was not to endorse it, but rather to give a concrete illustration of how the informational enrichment strategy permits an escape from Arrovian impossibility.
To criticise my discussion of Bayesianism on the grounds that it is not framed in terms of Kuhn's own criteria thus misses the dialectical point.
Morreau
Morreau (2014) In social choice, condition U says that the domain of the social choice rule is the set of all possible profiles of preference orders over the alternatives-the universal domain. This means that there are no a priori restrictions on the 8 preferences that individuals are allowed to have: whatever their preferences, the social choice rule is required to output an overall ranking of the alternatives.
As Morreau notes, one of Arrow's original motivations for U was epistemic: we may want to design an aggregation procedure before we know what the actual preference profile is. Thus in an election, the rule for combining the voters' rankings of the candidates into an overall ranking should ideally be specified before the ballot opens, and thus before the actual preference profile is known. A different motivation for considering multiple preference profiles was given by Kolm (1996 Kolm ( , 1997 choice. Thus if the set of alternatives includes theories T 1 and T 2 , and if T 1 is in fact simpler than T 2 , then any profile in the domain in which T 2 occurs higher up the simplicity ordering than T 1 describes a hypothetical scenario in which T 2 itself is simpler than T 1 itself; not a scenario in which some other pair of theories are so related. Morreau is right to stress this point, which I admit I overlooked when I argued that condition U as applied to theory choice is unexceptionable. This is a well-taken criticism.
One possible response might be to construe the 'alternatives' as abstract labels, denoting items whose identity is not necessarily fixed as we move from profile to profile. In social choice terms, this would be to suggest that the different profiles in the domain refer to patterns of preferences that the individuals might have had over different items bearing the same 'labels'. This suggestion has occasionally been mooted in the social choice literature, precisely to avoid the type of objection that Morreau is making, for example by Blackorby, Donaldson and Bossert (2006 p. 281 ). However in a recent paper, which complements his reply to my article, Morreau (2013) is sharply critical of treating the alternatives as 'labels', arguing that this constitutes a serious modification of the standard social choice framework and is a recipe for confusion. I agree with this assessment.
Let us grant then that some criteria for theory choice are rigid, and that
Arrow's condition U as applied to theory choice is inappropriate. What follows?
Morreau concludes that Arrow's theorem does not apply to theory choice, so there is no threat to the rationality of science. Because of rigidity, and the consequent inapplicability of condition U, Arrow's theorem 'gets no grip' he argues (ibid. p.
??), and so the 'impossibility scare' can be seen off (ibid. p. ??) . However this is too quick.
As is well-known, Arrow's condition U is actually much stronger than is needed to derive his impossibility result. Since the late 1970s, an extensive research program has investigated whether an impossibility result can be derived with weaker domain assumptions; the answer turns out to be yes. 4 Central to this literature is the notion of an 'Arrow-inconsistent domain', which refers to any subset of the universal domain on which Arrow's axioms N, P, and I are jointly Stegenga) . In this case the two criteria-prior probability and likelihood-are not rigid. Clearly, a given set of theories could be ordered by prior probability in any way, at least on a subjective interpretation of probability 8 ; and the same is true of the likelihood ordering, given that the empirical data might have been different. So in this case, the theory choice rule (the Bayesian theory choice functional) is able to avoid impossibility not because of domain restriction but because of informational enrichment, as proved in the Appendix to my original article.
To conclude, Morreau, Stegenga and I agree that scientists do choose between rival theories based on how those theories score against multiple criteria, and seem able to do this in a rational way. Given Arrow's theorem, a question 7 More accurately, I provided a full proof of the analogous claim in relation to my Bayesian example, and argued that a similar proof could be given for the statistical model selection case. See Okasha 2011 p. 100, fn. 22, and Appendix. 8 Here I assume that none of the theories logically implies any of the others. This is reasonable as otherwise the theories would not constitute genuine alternatives in the first place.
